

[redacted]
Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

11 February 1985

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Soviet Comments on Arms Talks--An Update

Public and private commentary continues to stress linkage between the three sets of issues to be discussed in Geneva and to allege that the United States plans to "militarize" space. While General Secretary Chernenko and other spokesmen say the agreed-upon framework has opened the way for positive results, Soviet commentators claim that the most recent US charges of Soviet noncompliance with arms control treaties and the President's determination to proceed with the SDI and other US strategic programs cast doubt upon US sincerity. [redacted]

Linkage

In the most authoritative statement since Foreign Minister Gromyko's press interview of 13 January, Chernenko in a written response to a US correspondent on 1 February reaffirmed that the Soviets saw an "organic interrelationship" between nuclear and space arms. He described the framework established in the US-Soviet agreement of 8 January as the "only possible" approach and asserted that no limitation or reduction of nuclear arms is attainable without "effective measures" to prevent the "militarization" of outer space. He said the US-Soviet agreement had created the basis for "serious and purposeful" negotiations, provided both sides adhere strictly to each part of it. [redacted]

A lengthy Izvestiya editorial on 25 January attacked the SDI and claimed the two sides had agreed in writing on the linkage between offensive and defensive strategic systems in the 1972 ABM treaty, which it dubbed the "cornerstone" of strategic arms limitations. The editorial stressed what it called an "organic" interconnection between nuclear and space weapons and, citing

This paper, the fourth in a series, was prepared by [redacted] of the Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and questions may be directed to the author [redacted] or to the Chief, Policy Analysis Division, [redacted]

SOVA M 85-10031X
[redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

Gromyko's press interview, asserted that talks on the problem of nuclear arms would be "devoid of meaning and prospect" without "preserving the ABM treaty" and banning the "militarization" of space. [redacted]

25X1

The reference in Izvestiya and in Chernenko's comments to the need to prevent the "militarization" of space contrasts with the joint statement agreed to by Secretary Shultz and Gromyko in Geneva that called for preventing an "arms race" in space. This appears to be an attempt to interpret the Geneva accord so as to preclude deployment of the broadest possible range of space weapons. [redacted]

25X1

US Seriousness

While not directly accusing the United States of approaching the talks in bad faith, Soviet commentators are asserting that the President's latest report to Congress on Soviet compliance with arms control treaties and his defense spending proposals call into question US expressions of sincerity in seeking an agreement. A TASS report in Izvestiya on 3 February charged that the President's report was a "crude fabrication" intended to prepare the ground for US "violation" of the ABM treaty and to "sour the atmosphere" on the eve of the US-Soviet talks. Publication of the proposed US budget for the next fiscal year prompted charges that US strategic programs, particularly the MX missile and the SDI, are aimed at achieving military superiority and are inconsistent with US professions of interest in holding "constructive" talks in Geneva. [redacted]

25X1

Soviet media also have criticized the recent article in The New York Times co-authored by Ambassador Kampelman. They allege that it advocates speedy deployment of ground- and space-based ABM defenses and expresses doubt over the possibility of achieving an acceptable arms agreement. Some of the criticism has been tempered with the observation that the article was written before Ambassador Kampelman's appointment to head the US delegation and that in the negotiations he will be acting under "instructions." A commentary on Moscow television declined to draw "far-reaching conclusions" from the article, but called it "a bad omen." [redacted]

25X1

President's Role

The Soviets are showing considerable interest in the President's views on the upcoming talks and the role he intends to play in directing them. Published commentaries on his state of the union message have quoted his reaffirmation of the US

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

commitment to "fair and verifiable" agreements, but have charged that his call for continued development of US strategic programs casts doubt on his intentions. They also continue to allege that "some members" of the administration are trying to "undermine" the Geneva agreement. Private comments indicate the Soviets believe the President is serious in seeking an agreement but may relinquish management of the talks to subordinates who are not:

[redacted]

25X1

- On 31 January, a deputy director of the USA Institute told a US diplomat that the President's personal involvement is "crucial" and that the Soviets are concerned the press of domestic issues may lead him "again" to turn arms control over to officials who do not believe in it and will use it only as a "cover" for an arms buildup. [redacted]

25X1

These public and private statements probably reflect some uncertainty over US intentions and a perception that there are still contending views within the administration over how to approach the talks. At the same time, they also represent a clear attempt to influence the way in which the administration manages the negotiations, with the aim of reducing the influence of those officials Moscow expects to oppose positions it would like the United States to adopt. [redacted]

25X1

Focus on Space

The Soviets continue to direct most of their commentary to the question of limiting space weapons, particularly the SDI. One newly prominent theme is concern over possible US capability to begin deploying space-based systems soon:

- The Soviet diplomat cited above said the USSR is worried the United States plans to deploy during the next four years a space defense system using existing laser or other technology as a "quick fix" should the arms talks fail.
- Commentaries criticizing the article co-authored by Ambassador Kampelman have reported that it claims an ABM system including space-based components "could be deployed right now."

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

-- The 25 January Izvestiya editorial charged that current and proposed tests of US ABM components aim at presenting the USSR with the "fait accompli" of a comprehensive ABM defense "in the near future." It also stated that "even the most insignificant differences" in the ABM capabilities of the two sides would be likely "substantially to undermine" strategic parity. [redacted]

25X1

The increased Soviet attention to those space-based systems the United States is believed closest to deploying probably reflects the view that blocking them would also impede the development of more advanced systems that would not be ready for deployment until well into the future. [redacted]

25X1

The Soviet diplomat highlighted another newly prominent theme by drawing a sharp distinction between ground-based defense systems for use against missiles that have reentered the atmosphere and space-based systems for use against missiles from lift-off through outer space trajectory. He claimed that the Soviet military does not believe the first type of defense constitutes an invulnerable first-strike capability, while the latter type "conceivably" does. He implied it would be possible to negotiate a revised ABM agreement that would accommodate the first type of system.

25X1

[redacted]

-- The 25 January Izvestiya editorial distinguished between the kind of ABM system now deployed in the USSR and a US system "with space-based elements." The editorial also denied that the Soviet air defense system bore any relation to ABM defense. [redacted]

25X1

START and INF Issues

While devoting primary attention to space weapons, Soviet commentary continues to criticize other US strategic programs. The principal target remains the MX ICBM, but other strategic systems also come under fire:

-- Izvestiya on 25 January listed six US strategic programs being developed "in parallel" with the SDI:

25X1

25X1

MX, Midgetman, D5 SLBM, "two new types" of heavy bombers, and "over 12,000" long-range cruise missiles "of all basing modes." It also claimed that US deployments around the USSR include new conventional weapons "whose efficiency approximates that of nuclear means." [redacted]

25X1

The Soviets continue to issue vague warnings that further US deployments of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe could jeopardize the Geneva talks:

- In a press conference on 26 January, Foreign Ministry spokesman Lomeyko quoted Gromyko's 13 January statement to that effect and said the Soviets hope the United States will take the warning "in all seriousness."
- Chernenko probably was referring indirectly to this issue in his written comments of 1 February in asserting that any steps "impeding constructive negotiations" would be "certainly inadmissible." [redacted]

In what promises to be a determined campaign to generate West European pressure upon the United States for "flexibility" at the Geneva talks, Soviet diplomats have formally presented Moscow's version of the January meeting between Secretary Shultz and Gromyko to a number of US allies. Some of their written statements have included the comment that the objective regarding intermediate-range nuclear weapons in the upcoming negotiations should be an accord on "simultaneously" stopping deployment of additional US and Soviet missiles and "subsequently" reducing such arms in Europe to an agreed level. The statements also repeat Soviet insistence on taking into account French and British missiles. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL**Distribution:**

1 - D/SOVA	
1 - D/OSWR	
1 - D/OIA	
1 - D/EURA	
1 - D/OGI	
1 - DDI Action Staff	
1 - SA/DCI	
1 - [redacted] ED/DCI	25X1
1 - DD/SOVA	
5 - OCPAS/IMD/CS	
1 - [redacted] OLL/DDI Rep	25X1
1 - Fritz Ermarth, NIO/USSR-EE	
1 - NIO/SP	
1 - NIO/EUR	
1 - C/ACIS	
1 - DDO/SE, [redacted]	25X1
1 - EO/NIC	
1 - [redacted] NIC	25X1
1 - [redacted] PES	25X1
1 - [redacted]	25X1
1 - [redacted]	
1 - [redacted]	25X1
1 - NCD/SOV	
1 - SA/SOVA	
1 - EO/SOVA	
1 - C/TFD	
1 - C/TWAD	
1 - C/SFD	
1 - C/EAD	
1 - C/DID	
1 - C/SED	
1 - C/SF/[redacted]	25X1
1 - C/SF/[redacted]	
1 - C/SF/[redacted]	
5 - SOVA/PA/E [redacted]	25X1
1 - SOVA/PA/D	
1 - SOVA/PA/S	
1 - SOVA/PA/E (Typescript Chrono)	
2 - SOVA/PAD (Chrono)	

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

External Distribution:

Mr. Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

The Honorable Michael H. Armacost
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Room 7240
Department of State

General James Williams
Director, DIA
3E 258
Pentagon

Ambassador Max Kampelman
S/DEL
Room 7208
New State

Ambassador Paul Nitze
S/DEL
Room 7208
New State

Ambassador John Tower
S/DEL
Room 7208
New State

Ambassador Edward Rowney
Room 4930
New State

General Aldridge
Office of the Joint Chiefs
Room 2E 959
Pentagon

Dr. James Timbie
Advisor for Strategic Policy
Office of the Deputy Secretary of State
7217
Department of State

Ambassador Jack Matlock
National Security Council Staff
Room 368
Old Executive Office Building

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Frank Gaffney
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Policy
4E 838
Pentagon

Dr. Henry Cooper
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Room 4498
Department of State

Mr. Mark Palmer
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs
Room 6219
Department of State

Mr. Robert Dean
Deputy Director, Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs
Room 7327
Department of State

Mr. Alexander Vershbow
Office Of Soviet Union Affairs
Bureau of European Affairs
Room 4217
Department of State

Mr. Thomas W. Simons
Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Bureau of European Affairs
Room 4217
Department of State

Mr. Olaf Groebel
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
7428
Department of State

Mr. R. Lucas Fischer
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
4487
Department of State

Mr. Victor Alessi
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Room 4495
Department of State

Mr. Abe Shulsky
Director Strategic Arms Control Policy
5A 670
Pentagon

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Michael Mobbs
Office of the Secretary of Defense
5A 670
Pentagon

Mr. Robert H. Baraz
Director, Office of Analysis for the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Room 4758
Department of State

Mr. W. D. Howells
Director, Office of Political-Military Analysis
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Room 6638
Department of State

Mr. Jeremy Azrael
Member, Policy Planning Council (S/P)
Room 7315
Department of State

Dr. Wynfred Joshua
DIO for European and Soviet
Political/Military Affairs
Room 2C238
The Pentagon

Mr. Raymond Firehock
Chief, Intelligence Division
US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Room 6510A
Department of State

CIA Rep NMIC
DIA/SSO (JSO-1)
Room 2D801-A
The Pentagon

Ms. Linda Wetzel
Policy Assistant for
USSR-EE Affairs
OASD/ISP/EUR-NATO Regional Policy
Room 1-D469
The Pentagon

Ms. Susan Koch
OASD/ISP/S&TNEP
Room 1-E760
The Pentagon

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Jay Kalner
c/o Mr. Firehock
ACDA
Room 6510A
Department of State

Mr. David Schwartz
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
Room 7430
Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL